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ABSTRACT The automotive industry is increasing its effort towards scientific and technological innovations
regarding autonomous vehicles. The expectation is a reduction of road accidents, which are too often
caused by human errors. Moreover, technological solutions, such as connected autonomous vehicle platoons,
are expected to help humans in emergency situations. In this context, safety and security issues do not
yet have a satisfactory answer. In this paper, we address the domain of secure communication among
vehicles – especially the issues related to authentication and authorization of inter-vehicular signals and
services carrying safety commands.We propose a novel designmethodology, where we take a contract-based
approach for specifying safety, and combine it in the design flow with the use of the Arrowhead Framework
to support security. Furthermore, we present the results through a demo, which employs model-based design
for software implementation and the physical realization on autonomous model cars.
INDEX TERMS Contract-based approach, arrowhead framework, security and safety co-design,
autonomous vehicles, heterogeneous design.
I. INTRODUCTION
The trend towards the adoption of autonomous vehicles has
been tremendously increasing in the last few years, with
the expectation of a significant reduction of road accidents,
increased fuel economy and an overall higher traffic through-
put [1]–[3]. Today, road tests of autonomous vehicles are
in place in several countries, such as those from Uber in
Pittsburgh [4] and from Valeo in France [5]. For example,
in the Valeo test, an autonomous car drives on the Paris
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving
it for publication was Lei Shu.
beltway, automatically adapting its speed to traffic condi-
tions. During the road tests, the French authorities demand
a human driver supervisor (in the car), whose duty is to act
in emergency situations. Their presence also reassures other
drivers, who do not realize that the car is an autonomous
vehicle. The objective, however, is to eventually reach full
autonomy, increasing both safety and average throughput,
using appropriate distributed control techniques.
A careful examination of road tests reveals several open
problems both at the scientific and technical level, as well
as at the economic and social level. Clearly, traffic control is
best tackled through a cooperative approach, where vehicles
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exchange information to jointly build a detailed picture of
the current situation [6], [7]. This, in turn, requires an effi-
cient and secure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication
mechanism to exchange information (e.g., an obstacle on the
road) [8], [9]. At the same time, the heterogeneous nature of
the problem, and its fast evolution, demand a standardized
infrastructure and a design methodology by which design-
ers can unambiguously formulate the requirements and the
properties of the system, to deliver functional as well as
non-functional safety guarantees [10]. This is essential to
drive the adoption of the technology, and lower the risk
perceived by the user. For this reason, we are witnessing an
increasing demand in considering both safety and security
properties together [11], [12]. Nonetheless, this trend is ham-
pered because those properties are specified, analyzed and
developed by different teams having different backgrounds
and tools. Moreover, in many critical applications, safety
properties shall be compliant to specific safety standards for
system certification.
The main novelty and contribution of our work is to
provide a methodology that starting from natural language
requirements reaches the prototyping stage of a platooning
autonomous vehicle system, with an additional focus on
safety and security requirements. Moreover, the proposed
methodology is compliant with the ISO26262 [13] safety
norm. A newer norm called ISO/PAS 21448:2019 Road
vehicles – Safety Of The Intended Functionality (SOTIF),
addressing the different levels of autonomy especially in
emergency intervention systems, was recently released;
SOTIF is not discussed in this paper but, being an extension
of ISO26262, our work can be made compliant with it as
future work. We show that a secure communication protocol
between autonomous vehicles can raise conflicts with the
safety requirements and decrease the overall safety level of
the system. Thanks to the Arrowhead Framework [14] we are
able to select a suitable security algorithm compatible with
the safety requirements. In this work we consider vehicles
pertaining to a single stakeholder; an extension to multiple
stakeholders could use blockchains technology at platoon
creation time, and then progress as per this paper.
In this context, our research work focuses on delivering and
combining these two aspects.
First, we address the problem of specifying and verifying
the correct and safe behavior of the system by means of a
contract-based approach [15], which separates assumptions
from guarantees, partitioning the properties across the vari-
ous components and teams. This method is particularly well
suited to the distributed nature of the application, where
several vehicles contribute to ensure a positive final outcome.
We integrate contracts with well known standards, such as
SysML, to facilitate their adoption in traditional design flows,
and with three dimensional animated scenarios, to offer a bet-
ter understating of the cyber-physical system being analyzed.
Second, we combine this technique with a Service
OrientedArchitecture (SOA) based on the Arrowhead Frame-
work [14] to manage all V2V communication activities,
ensuring security. This approach provides all the benefits of
SOAs (e.g., service reuse and composition, loose coupling
of functionalities) [16] enhanced by the capabilities of the
Arrowhead Framework (e.g., service discovery, orchestra-
tion, security).
Moreover, similarly to the contract-based approach,
streamlining all interactions by means of formally-defined
service interfaces allows easier application to distributed sys-
tems. This methodology is supported by a dedicated tool,
called CAT (Contract Analysis Tool), which integrates the
different parts and drives the analysis engine. We present our
results using a physical demonstration that employs model
cars [17].
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review related
work and discuss background material in Section II. Then,
Section III provides the core of the promoted design method-
ology and discusses its compliance with safety standards.
Section IV constitutes the bulk of our study, and deals with
the technical details of the methodology. This includes sur-
veying heterogeneous tools and languages, to be used for a
platooning vehicle system, from the early specification to the
physical realization on autonomous model cars. The analysis
of the results is introduced in Section V. Finally, Section VI
provides an extended outlook of the social and economical
impact of the proposed methodologies, and summarizes our
conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
Developing safe and secure communication systems for
autonomous vehicles is a challenging problem that has been
extensively studied in the literature. Willke et al. present
the main techniques and their applications [18], while more
recently Dressler et al. discuss research directions for new
generation protocols [19]. Notably, the ETSI TC ITS work-
ing group leads the European standardization activities to a
secure V2V communication [20]. Among the main concerns,
the group addresses trust of the communication, exchange
formats for messages and protocols, as well as the impact of
technological design to guarantee privacy issues. To guaran-
tee trust, vehicles receive a certificate by a common authority.
To guarantee privacy, vehicles receive a pseudonym, which is
regularly changed to reduce the risk of full traceability.
Tomanage safety, some protocols use periodic messages to
provide general information (such as the position of the vehi-
cle and velocity) and event-trigger messages to communicate
safety information (e.g., accident in position XYZ) [21].
Most of the existing approaches address safety issues by
considering the impact of security protocol communication
and the guarantee of privacy. Indeed, the time needed to
manage both privacy and security policies could impact the
safety commands execution [8], [21], [22]. This decreases
the safety level of a vehicle – thus generating a conflict
with the ISO26262 standard [13]. In particular, collision
avoidance can suffer from the adopted communication pro-
tocol [8] as well the adopted pseudonym exchange policy
(silent period) [23], [24]. Considering these existing works,
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we directly address safety and security issues at the start of
the design phase. Safety properties, including collision avoid-
ance, are specified by contracts, while security is ensured
by adopting the Arrowhead Framework, which supports a
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and promotes a sep-
aration of concerns between services and communication
protocols. Like the Arrowhead Framework, SEROSA [25] is
based on SOA principles and supports security and privacy
solutions for vehicular communication. SEROSA introduces
two different protocols: a protocol for the service acquisition
(authentication) and a protocol for pseudonym resolution and
revocation. The main advantage is that SEROSA does not
need to initialize the system if an authentication command
is sent. On the other hand, the Arrowhead Framework is
becoming a de facto European standard platform for several
applications domains.
The aim of our work is to extend the support of Arrowhead
towards safety issues handled with contracts. Aligned with
current practices [9], [26], [27], Arrowhead makes use of
certificates to implement secure communication. One of the
key problems, also raised by the literature described above,
has to do with the delay introduced by the security key
exchange process, which may have adverse safety effects.
In the contract-based extension, we use specific constructs
in the safety assertions to formally define the temporal con-
straints, and then take them into account during simulation
and verification to validate the design. The service oriented
architecture implemented using Arrowhead services uses cer-
tificates to generate security tokens [28], which are subse-
quently used to provide lightweight security to the actual
communication. This approach is particularly effective in
our vehicle platooning case study, since we perform the
more time consuming actions early during platoon creation,
to benefit later of a secure communication channel with low
overhead. Moreover, being the security tokens temporary,
they can also limit the danger of security key leakage: after
being detected as malicious, a system would still be able
to authenticate itself by means of its certificate, but then it
would not be authorized by the Arrowhead Framework and
its security token would not get renewed.
A. CONTRACT-BASED DESIGN
To reduce the complexity of system design, relevant
standards, such as AUTOSAR [29], define a multi-layered
abstraction framework resulting in a complete decoupling
of automotive software functions starting from the underly-
ing hardware controllers. However, to ensure safety require-
ments, a failure hypothesis in these frameworks must often
be propagated over multiple layers, breaking the principle of
separation of concerns.
To solve this dilemma, we adopt a contract-based
approach, which abstracts from the particular implementa-
tion of software and hardware components of the designed
communication system by defining safety assumptions and
promises of these components [30]. By replacing real
implementations with contracts, developers can achieve a
significant reduction of the system design and implemen-
tation time. In particular, we use contracts in this paper
to construct a specification that crosses the boundaries
between vehicles, while retaining their separation through the
use of assumptions and guarantees. The application of the
contract-based approach can be facilitated by the adoption
of formalized languages enabling modeling and execution of
failure propagation models [31], [32]. In this work, we adopt
the pattern-based language BCL [33], which is oriented to
semi-formal simulation-based methods that proved to be
able to handle real-world systems efficiently, in contrast to
approaches based solely on formal methods [34]. In addition,
BCL can be integrated with Matlab/Simulink, and has been
shown to provide an efficient path to dependability assess-
ment for service oriented specifications (SOA), which is at
the basis of this work [35]. The formal semantics of BCL
is defined by mapping the patterns into Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) [33]. This mapping also serves as the contract
implementation that we use when we want to analyze the
specification during simulation. While we could conceivably
use LTL directly for contract specification, BCL offers a
simpler and more constrained formalism, which helps avoid
mistakes and is more easily mastered by designers not famil-
iar with formal assertions.
B. ARROWHEAD FRAMEWORK
We adopt the Arrowhead Framework [14] to specify, analyze
and ensure the security properties of the system, such as
the authentication and authorization of the control-command
signal. In Arrowhead, all interactions are mediated by means
of services, produced and consumed by systems, and executed
on devices. The latter can manifest themselves as any kind
of provider of computational capabilities, e.g., an embed-
ded system, a laptop, or a virtual machine in the cloud.
A distributed application is implemented on top of a System
of Systems, which is a set of systems that interact in an
Arrowhead-compliant manner. Services are offered as a set of
functions that can be invoked remotely, and communication
can be mediated by different communication technologies, as
Arrowhead is agnostic to the underlying protocols. This com-
prises the format encoding the messages (e.g., JSON, XML,
MQTT), the communication protocol (e.g., HTTP, HTTPS,
XMPP) and the communication paradigm (e.g., REST,
publish/subscribe).
Arrowhead normalizes all interactions by means of SOA,
and thus enables interoperability between systems that are
natively based on different technologies. This approach sim-
plifies software development and maintenance activities,
thus reducing dramatically time-to-market, supporting the
deployment, and improvingmaintainability of interconnected
cooperative applications. Finally, being service-oriented,
applications enjoy advantages of loose coupling in space,
time and synchronization [36].
Arrowhead services are divided into application services
and core services. Application services implement the func-
tional requirements of the use cases, while core services
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manage the application of non-functional requirements and
the platform itself. The core services provide tangible added
value for the users of the Arrowhead Framework. Some
services are ‘‘mandatory’’ and need to be present in any
system of systems design, others are ‘‘supporting’’, helping
designers and integrators focus on the main functionality of
their system, and leave other utilities to the framework.
The mandatory core services are ServiceRegistry, Orches-
tration, and Authorization (see Figure 1). In order to support
deeper understanding of the technical background regarding
our solution, the following paragraphs provide an overview
of these core services.
FIGURE 1. A generic System of Systems in the Arrowhead Framework. The
colors of the connectors represent the service producer system.
ServiceRegistry is used to keep track of all services
and systems active in the system of systems. In particu-
lar, each system publishes the offered services through the
ServiceRegistry, acting as the entry point which is then inter-
rogated by other systems to perform the discovery of services
and systems.
Orchestration, in the context of SOA [16], is the process
that defines how systems get interconnected and provide
their services to other systems. This operation is executed by
systemswanting to consume a service, and it allows the re-use
of existing services and systems to create new services and
functionalities [37]. The Orchestration services makes use
of ServiceRegistry to acquire a list of systems and services.
It then computes a match between the systems requiring ser-
vices, the service requests, and the systems that can provide
them.
In an Arrowhead-compliant system of systems, a service
can only be accessed by an authorized consumer. Authenti-
cation is managed by means of X.509 certificates [38], and
authorization is performed through the Authorization service.
Systems contact the service with their credentials and use
it to authenticate themselves, and to consequently be able
to access other systems for service fruition. The implemen-
tation used in this work is token-based authorization pro-
vided by the Arrowhead Framework: during orchestration,
the service consumer receives an authorization token that
validates it and allows for further interactions with the service
provider.
III. OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
In this section, we discuss the steps that we use in our
methodology tomake the analysis systematic, so that it can be
implemented in a usable and structured design process. The
case study is intended to validate and evaluate the different
phases of the methodology. Because of the strong dependen-
cies of our case study on physical factors, such as commu-
nication latency and sensors, and the degree of autonomy
afforded by the software control, we operate in the domain
of Cyber-Physical Systems. For this reason, we propose an
inclusive approach based on heterogeneous languages and
tools, including different functionalities and teams. The main
advantage is an open and modular design flow that affords
flexibility and adaptability to internal languages, tools and
processes, adopted by the industry.
Our approach, shown in Figure 3, is composed of a series
of steps supported by CAT (Contract Analysis Tool) and by
theArrowhead Framework. In the figure, themain steps of the
methodology are identified by blocks, to which we associate
the input and output information (shown on the left and on
the right, respectively). As expected, in some cases the output
of one block is the input for the next phase, as is often the
case in the validation steps. The steps shown in the figure also
refer to where the design phase applies with respect to the
feasibility study (Section IV) and the experimental analysis
on the safety and security integration (Section V). Figure 2
shows the underlying tool architecture designed to support
the logical steps of the methodology. The designer input is
managed by CAT for design and verification, which in turn
relies on Arrowhead for the runtime environment. In the rest
of this section, we describe each step.
FIGURE 2. Tool architecture, showing the information flow between
design and verification in CAT and the runtime environment.
A. CONTRACT SPECIFICATION IN BCL
The activities begin with an informal identification of the user
needs, expressed mostly in natural language, focusing on the
safety and security aspects.
To make them usable for analysis, these requirements must
be formalized, together with an initial specification of the sys-
tem architecture. For the first part, we adopt a contract-based
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FIGURE 3. The steps of the design flow, from specification to prototyping.
approach, which can neatly distinguish between the respon-
sibilities of different components in the form of assumptions
and guarantees, expressed as assertions in the pattern-based
BCL language [33]. BCL is convenient, because the natural
language requirements map logically to the patterns, which
add structure and help avoid the most common mistakes. The
contracts expressed by the assertions are traced, measured
and validated along the design flow, to help address cross-
layer issues. The architecture and functionality of the design
are instead specified in SysML, an OMG standard which is
broadly adopted in the industry, using the Eclipse IDE.
B. 2D MODELING
The use case, generally initially expressed in natural lan-
guage, is modeled using a component-based formalism.
In this work, we adopt SysML, because it is a widely used
OMG standard, supported by industrial tools (often, but not
always) available via open-tools (e.g., IBM, PTC/Artisan
Studio, Softeam, Papyrus). In Figure 3, the SysML model is
the output of the modeling phase and the input for CAT.
C. CAT - IMPLEMENTATION VERSION FOR ECPLISE
The contracts and the system architecture are brought
together in a combined SysML specification, where the
individual assertions are associated to the ports of the com-
ponents, while contracts are associated to the components
themselves. This makes assertions reusable across different
entities in the design, an essential feature to make program-
ming more efficient and to prevent errors. The integration
and annotation of the SysML specification with contracts
can be accomplished in several ways. In our methodology,
CAT defines a meta-model and a domain-specific language
extending SysML with the appropriate notions of
contract, guarantee and assumption as UML
Metaclass constraints (see Figure 4). This choice is based
on industrial requirements, provided by early feasibility tests
in the railway application domain [39], where the properties
were expressed as OCL constraints. CAT functions as an
add-on Eclipse plug-in and is based on Java4UML. Because
assumptions and guarantees may belong to several different
contracts, they are represented as stereotype.
FIGURE 4. Domain-Specific Language interface between BCL and
SysML/UML.
D. 3D MODELING
One distinctive feature of our methodology, which is partic-
ularly useful in distributed and dynamic scenarios such as
autonomous vehicles, is the ability to simulate the system
through a three-dimensional animated model. A 3D repre-
sentation can graphically simplify complex problems and
offers a better understanding of the issues being analyzed.
We choose Blender as modeling tool because it is free and
open-source, and provides flexible interfaces for integrating
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external tools. Moreover, Blender contains many features that
are characteristic of high-end 3D software. The feature that
most interests us is the Python scripting tool for creation and
prototyping, task automation and custom tools. The built-in
Python console and text editor makes it simple to integrate
scripts and customize the software at will. The 3D model is
the output of this phase and the input for CAT.
E. CAT - IMPLEMENTATION IN PYTHON
CAT is used through the Python interface of Blender to
extend the 3D model with contracts where the assertions
are expressed in LTL, the underlying formal semantics of
BCL [33]. CAT then verifies the validity of the contracts
for each step of the 3D simulation, providing evidence of
the correct and safe behavior of the system or, in case of a
negative result, detecting the contract violations.
F. ARROWHEAD FRAMEWORK
The specification of security aspects follows a parallel
bottom-up path, and is grounded on and assisted by the
Arrowhead Framework. The design paradigm is to separate
the application protocol from the underlying infrastructure
services that implement the communication primitives. We
consider that communication is articulated into three steps
(discovery of recipient, authorization, data exchange) and
that each communication primitive must take care of all of
them, either in advance (e.g., authentication during hand-
shake) or on demand (e.g., authentication done when sending
a message). SOA allows the use of services for all of these
operations. In the particular case of the Arrowhead Frame-
work, different implementations can be provided for the
communication primitives, for instance to compare different
approaches and scenarios. For example, both the discovery
and the authentication steps can be done in advance when
targeting the same recipient, for performance sake.Moreover,
different protocols can be used for each step, for example to
grant different degrees of security to each message.
Security imposes certain requirements on the system
behavior, such as employing defined processes for data
exchange or an appropriate communication set up, whichmay
lead to an unexpected violation of a contract. The communi-
cation primitives taken into account by the safety contracts
are considered abstract operations, and their interpretation
as guarantees is as lazy as possible to delay their res-
olution to actual delays. The timing analysis is thus articu-
lated into two steps. The first step considers the application
protocol and builds an expression that expresses the timing
guarantees of the protocol. Later on, the implementation
of the primitives are taken into account, to associate delays
to their executions. The values used for the delay associated
to each implementation of a primitive are computed by either
formal proofs or by means of benchmarking.
G. INTEGRATION
In our methodology, the model in Blender is therefore anno-
tated with the additional performance information considered
for each primitive, which are later on resolved to time delay
gathered from the system prototype. The final step is to
perform an integrated verification. This can be accomplished
by checking the consistency of each component implementa-
tion with the corresponding contract. If satisfied, and if no
violation was detected in the previous CAT analysis, then
the contract theory guarantees correctness by compositional
rules [30]. While potentially conservative, the advantage of
this strategy is that contract implementation can be checked
separately on each component. Otherwise, the CAT analysis
can be repeated with refined contracts and performance val-
ues, to provide an overall integrated verification. In particular,
in our case study, we evaluate both the abstract behavior and
the measured performance to tackle the interaction between
safety contracts and security.
H. ADA
The following step consists in the development of the actual
embedded software. While this step is still manual in our
design flow, the experience and results obtained through
the early model evaluation are instrumental to implement-
ing code that is well structured and satisfies the constraints.
A model transformation tool is planned for our future work.
We target the Ada language, because of the guarantees that
it can provide in the domain of critical systems and its
widespread adoption by the industry.
I. COMPLIANCE WITH ISO26262
The combined use of the Arrowhead Framework and the
contract-based approach is consistent with the directives
of safety international standards, such as ISO26262 [13]
and CENELEC [40]–[42] in the automotive and railway
domains, respectively. Compliance with the standards can
be determined by satisfying one or more objectives in the
norms and by non-interferingwith pre-existing industrial pro-
cesses. Our methodology is to some extent independent of the
particular languages employed, letting companies integrate
the approach in their internal processes, including the safety
management policy (e.g., ref. [13], Part II, Clauses 5, 6 and 7)
and (qualified) tools, and eventually supporting the argu-
ments to be presented to the certification authority.
Clause 5 aims ‘‘to develop a description of the item with
regard to its functionality, interfaces, environmental condi-
tions, legal requirements, known hazards, etc. The boundary
of the item and its interfaces, as well as assumptions con-
cerning other items, elements, systems and components are
determined’’.
With no intention of settling the issue but only to suggest a
possibly simplistic strategy for that compliance, we use con-
tracts as a means to specify the safety and security properties
that the systems should meet on the system’s and compo-
nents’ interfaces. We model the system under examination
in 2D (via SysML), where components, functionality and
requirements are specified. Then we simulate the system
in 3D (via Blender). This simulation provides an immediate
visualization of the overall system and wished properties.
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We use CAT (Contract Analysis Tool) to specify and verify
safety-related properties on both 2D and 3D system model-
ing (technical details are provided in Section IV). Security
properties are firstly specified via contracts, then modeled
and tested using data extracted via experiments with the
Arrowhead Framework. Finally, we use the Ada program-
ming language to develop the embedded code. The promoted
methodology does not constrain industries to adopt a prede-
fined language, i.e., industries can adopt their modeling and
embedded programming languages as well as their know-
how. Instead, the promoted methodology helps industries
provide a clear and structured definition of a component and
of its dependencies and/or interactions with the environment
and other components, and therefore it meets Objective 5
(‘‘The objective of this clause is to define the requirements
for the organizations that are responsible for the safety life-
cycle, or that perform safety activities in the safety lifecycle’’)
and Clause 5 of ref. [13].
A complete study of compliance is on-going. Moreover,
our future work aims to address ISO/PAS 21448:2019.
In our case study, the code as well as the adopted hetero-
geneous multi-sensor architecture are only introduced as an
instance of the methodology and cannot be, in any case, used
in an industrial application without validation. Nevertheless,
the specification of safety and security requirements and their
analysis facilitates this critical step, detecting errors as early
as possible and therefore reducing the overall cost in the
design and developments phases
IV. FEASIBILITY STUDY
In this section, we illustrate the steps of our methodology on
a fully fledged case study, involving autonomous cars.
Natural Language Use Case Specification: The case study
is based on the concept of platoon of vehicles [43], [44].
A system of systems is called a ‘‘platoon’’ if the systems are
able to operate closely together and, moreover, one system
is able to send control signals to the others. The concept
of vehicle platooning aims to increase road capacity, traffic
fluidity and could be useful in emergency scenarios.
We consider a platooning system composed of k connected
vehicles V1...Vk , as shown in Figure 5 for k = 3. In our use
case, Vehicle V1 is the leader.
Natural Language Requirements: In the rest of this paper,
we address the following two properties. First, the V2V
communication ought to be safe: if vehicle V1 detects an
obstacle on its route, then V1 alerts V2 through a brake signal.
This V2V communication shall be guaranteed within a given
elapsed time. Second, the V2V communication ought to be
secure. This involves that the authorization and authentication
phases should be guaranteed.
A. CONTRACTS SPECIFICATION
We formalize safety properties using contracts. Broadly
speaking, a contract is a pair (assumptions, guarantee) such
that the guarantee is a service provided by the component and
the assumptions are the requirements needed to accomplish
FIGURE 5. A platoon of connected vehicles.
TABLE 1. System Requirements, formalized as guarantees and
assumptions.
the guarantee. Table 1 introduces the subset of assertions
that we use to build contracts that deal with the brake signal
control command. In BCL, contracts are expressed using
patterns and expressions over the system variables. Patterns
are built in layers to express invariants in terms of events and
their time and logical relations. In particular, the keywords
Everytime [E] then [C] assert that whenever event E occurs,
the event C also occurs, while the keyword within delimits
the constraint in the time domain. The keyword always spec-
ifies that a timing constraint must be satisfied at every instant.
Other assertions, which we do not show for brevity, can be
used to model other aspects of the system.
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We denote by ListV the (finite) list of vehicles in the
platooning system, where V1 and Vk are the first and the last
vehicle, respectively. Each vehicle Vi ∈ ListV communicates
with Vi−1 and Vi+1. Each assertion is related to a component,
as either an assumption or a guarantee. For instance, asser-
tion r5 asserts that if vehicle Vi receives an alarm signal and
Vi is not in the last position of the list (Vk ), then it propagates
the signal alarm further.
We build contracts by combining a set of assumptions with
a guarantee. For instance,
Contract Vi2Vi+1Latency = (r3, r5).
states that the maximum time of a V2V alarm message trans-
mission (X ms in Guarantee r5) is guaranteed if the WiFi
connection is always available (Assumption r3). This implies
that engineers have to pay attention to theWiFi infrastructure,
which should be resilient even in the cases of emergency and
catastrophic scenarios.
Contract Stop = ((r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r11), r7)
asserts the maximum latency to stop all vehicles in the
platooning system. Guarantee r7 represents the worst case
execution time (WCET) for the whole chain of control.
Parameter W depends on a set of variables, such as velocity
and weight. The contract is based on the messaging latency
between two vehicles (X ), the time to send the Brake com-
mand internally (Y ) and the time to fully stop the vehicle (W ).
The two contracts
Contract Detection Min. Distance = ((r1, r2, r3, r8), r9)
Contract DetectionMax.Distance= ((r1, r2, r3, r8),r10)
define the minimum and the maximum acceptable distance
between vehicles, respectively. The contracts are primarily
used to keep a safe distance between each pair of consecu-
tive vehicles. For instance, when an animal crosses the road
between the first and the second vehicle, the obstacle is
detected by the second vehicle, but not by the first which
cannot send the alarm brake command. To avoid an accident,
the second vehicle becomes the leader of the platooning
system: it brakes, sends the brake alarm to the next vehicle1
and notifies the previous of the current operation (Con-
tract Detection Max. Distance). The contract assumes r8,
i.e., a multi-sensors heterogeneous architecture (a minimum
of position, velocity and data from an ultrasonic sensor
is demanded) able to detect obstacles. Naturally, Contract
Detection Min. Distance is also in place between the second
and the third vehicle.
Contract Detection Min. Distance is a means to
reduce the threshold of severity that could occur in an
accident [13], [45]. Indeed, in the case of a failure of the
communication system, the embedded system is able to
automatically brake, thanks to the exploitation of the multi-
sensors heterogeneous architecture and the related embedded
1Assertions r1 and r2. The related contracts are omitted
functionality. For the sake of completeness, our prototype
realizes also the automatic reduction of velocity of the
system [17].
Contract Secure Authentication = (r11, r12)
asserts the maximum latency needed to have authentication
and authorization of a service. Finally,
Contract Safe&Secure Brake Command =
((r3, r8, r11, r12), r4)
guarantees that a vehicle executes the alarm brake command,
which has been received from an authenticated vehicle. The
assumptions are a WiFi infrastructure, resilient to catas-
trophic scenarios, an embedded multi-sensors heterogeneous
architecture able to detect the distance between vehicles in
real time and the Arrowhead support infrastructure.
During the design and development phases, engineers
specify the variables with the expected values and perform
some (static) analysis to verify that the systemmeets all dead-
lines. This analysis is currently adopted in the industry and
aims to reduce, or avoid, the possibility to find an error late in
the development phase [46]. In our use case, we let X andW
be 100 ms and 120 ms, respectively.
B. 2D MODELING AND CAT
Figure 6 represents part of the SysML model of the scenario
(ref. Figure 5), including Contract Vi2Vi+1Latency.
In the figure, the three blocks represent the leader vehicle,
a vehicle in the platoon system and the WiFi infrastructure.
Both vehicles use the WiFi, represented via a vertical con-
nector between the corresponding ports. The leader vehicle
is able to send the alarm to the second vehicle, represented
by two ports and the horizontal connector. Assumption r3
is allocated to the connector between WiFi and a vehicle,
and by extension to its connected ports. Guarantee r2 is allo-
cated to the connector between the two vehicles. Contract
Vi2Vi+1Latency is allocated to the vehicle, which receives
the Brake command. CAT gives designers the freedom of
selecting the best option to allocate assumptions, guarantees
and contracts. For instance, in Contract Vi2Vi+1Latency,
we use connectors as target model elements to specify
the assumption and guarantee, increasing readability of the
model.
C. 3D MODELING AND CAT
In order to have a better view of the unfolding of the system,
we construct a 3D model of our scenario in Blender (ref
Figure 7). More specifically, we construct a 3D model of a
platoon containing k = 3 vehicles on a highway. We then
define an animated scenario where the platoon is going at a
regular speed on the highway, and the leader of the platoon
detects a stopped truck on the road. The first vehicle starts
braking and sends an alert signal to the following vehicles that
start braking as well, until the whole platoon is fully stopped.
This scenario, while simple to describe, involves many safety
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FIGURE 6. Platooning System 2D Model with contracts.
FIGURE 7. Platooning System 3D Model with contracts. Once contracts
were validated, we generated the video, available on https://youtu.
be/jSvLUz4hURM
issues that are not visible at first sight and that need to be
investigated.
After constructing the 3D model and defining animated
scenarios, we use CAT to verify compliance with the con-
tracts. As discussed, the current implementation of CAT
exploits Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) as a formal underlying
language. In the literature, a first LTL tool, integrated with
Blender and developed in Python 2, was proposed in [47].
CAT (based on Python 3) capitalizes on that result.
For an example, Contract Detection Min. Distance
becomes the following set of LTL propositions:
Similarly, we specify Propositions 5 to 8 for each other
vehicle in the platooning system (please note that for the
last vehicle Vk we specify Propositions 5 to 7 only, since
Vk does not transfer the brake command to other vehicles).
We use CAT to introduce the above LTL propositions. Then,
we specify the LTL formula
Globally[prop1→ [prop2 ∧ prop3 ∧ prop4]]
which stands for At all states, the distance between two given
vehicles of the platoon should not be less than 25 meters.
If it is less, then the subsequent vehicle simultaneously sends
three commands: braking, sending the brake command alarm
to the next vehicle (if it exists) and notifying the previous
one. At the implementation level, their execution is delayed
due to hardware constraints, multi-sensors architecture, and
software implementation.
To capture the overall semantics of Contract Detec-
tion Min. Distance, we need a formula for each pair
of vehicles (at the implementation level, we optimize the
formulas being tested). Finally, we specify the proposi-
tions and the formula in the animated scenarios. CAT is
able to automatically verify the formula, thanks to Python
scripting.
Contract Secure Authentication becomes the following
set of LTL propositions:
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We then specify the following LTL proposition:
Globally[prop1→ [prop2 ∧ prop3]]
which stands for At all states, a secure authentication is
established in less than 120 ms. Technically, a 3D scenario
is a set of frames combined together with keys representing
the set of values of all parameters involved within the model
at a specific frame: object locations, physical constraints, etc.
The verification process of the temporal constraints is based
on assigning states to frames. As a result, the notion of time
is summed up into frames: we can choose which time unit
to assign for each frame by manipulating the FPS (Frame
Per Second) [48]. Although we can specify and verify timing
constraints in CAT, we need specific tools to accomplish
exact measures, such as the Arrowhead Framework support.
D. ARROWHEAD FRAMEWORK
In this work, we use only the mandatory core services of
the Arrowhead Framework, to achieve trust between the
members of the platoon. Automotive units are connected
together via a multi-hop wireless protocol, for example
ad-hoc IEEE 802.11g or IEEE 802.11p. One automotive unit
(the leader) hosts the mandatory Arrowhead core services.
Communication is service-oriented, so, for instance,
each automotive unit that offers an application service
BrakeSignal registers it in the Service Registry system
hosted by the leader. Later on, each automotive unit com-
pletes its setup by looking for the BrakeSignal service
through the Orchestration service, and by authenticating
against them. After that, the automotive units will start
driving in a line, and each unit can exchange messages
with the following and preceding unit. Refer to Figure 1 in
Section II-B for a representation of the interactions between
the involved systems, considering that the application service
mediating the interaction is the BrakeSignal service.
We consider that the messages are sent by the preceding
unit to the following one. The initiator of a brake signal chain
of message exchanges is thus the leader.
To test our approach, two implementations were taken into
consideration:
• Simple Web Service (SWS), which considers that the
unit receiving the message publishes a service, which is
then contacted by the unit that intends to send amessage;
• Web Service with persistent HTTPS implementation
(Server-Sent Events, or SSE), which considers that the
unit available to send a message publishes a service,
the unit that wants to receive it connects to the service,
and the service is kept on a keepalive status. The ser-
vice publisher will then send the message to the service
consumer when time due.
Both protocols have been tested in a cleartext (HTTP) and
in a secured (HTTPS with Arrowhead tokens) manner as
well. Authentication for the latter cases are provided by the
X.509 certificate hierarchy of Arrowhead [28].
E. PROTOTYPING AND IMPLEMENTATION
Video animations of the braking alarm propagation sce-
nario of Figure 5 using platoons of two and three
wheeled robots are available on YouTube under the links
http://y2u.be/2WHyy5Z7nv4 and http://y2u.be/Cl-vGISxBe4.
The communication architecture of the distributed appli-
cation comprising our wheeled robots is given in Figure 8.
The two robots are represented in the Arrowhead Framework
by one Arrowhead system each, and can communicate in a
secure manner through either a Simple Web Service pub-
lished into the Arrowhead Framework, or using Service-Sent
Events (see Section IV-D). The two systems can also commu-
nicate with the core systems of the Arrowhead Framework
(see Section II-B), which are deployed on the first robot,
to discover their communication recipients, for authentica-
tion, and for key management.
The hardware of the robot, whose picture is reported in
Figure 9, is composed of: 1) four micro DC (Direct Current)
geared motors used to rotate the wheels with a power supply
of 7.5V, 2) two motor encoders with a resolution of 20 PPR
(Pulses Per motor Revolution) which can be fixed on the
front or rear motors, 3) an ultrasonic sensor (HC-SR04)
positioned at the front of the robot, 4) a Romeo (DFRobot
product) low-level slave robot controller used to efficiently
interface (using Arduino functions) with the three first hard-
ware components, and 5) a Raspberry Pi (RPi) master high-
level control card onwhich the control software is deployed to
command the Romeo board. Data exchange is wired between
the two boards using the I2C bus.
The control software is distributed and real-time and
based on object-oriented component-based method of design.
It is implemented using the annexes D and E of the Ada
Reference Manual resp. of real-time and distributed sys-
tems. Annex E (commonly abbreviated DSA) makes the
middleware layer completely transparent and the develop-
ment much easier. The distribution in our software is man-
aged by the middleware PolyORB [49] maintained by the
company AdaCore. It supports different distribution models
including CORBA and DSA but also the Ravenscar profile
(a restricted tasking Ada subset used for hard real-time).
Interoperability and service invocations between vehicles is
simply implemented as method calls on references to remote
objects [17].
The application is executed under fully preemptive ver-
sions of Linux kernel 4.4.21 (patch Preempt_RT). Prior tests
were made to evaluate low latency, preemption and deadline
respectfulness of the scheduler SCHED_FIFO under extremely
stressful processing conditions using the tools cyclictest
and hackbench [50], but also Ada concurrent programs.
Results were positive arguing a high level of real-time deter-
minism and low run-time overhead. Control run-time jobs
of each robot are executed concurrently in deadline-sensitive
periodic tasks. They have priority over system calls and
scheduled using SCHED_FIFO enabled by the Ada dispatching
policy FIFO_Within_Priorities [17].
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FIGURE 8. Wheeled robots communication architecture.
FIGURE 9. Hardware architecture of the wheeled robot.
The Contract Vi2Vi+1Latency on networking latency
between two robots in the platoon is natively supported by the
code 2 (see [17] for details). The parameter X was defined to
be the deadline of the driving job of robots. In order to ensure
the contract, we simply check the deadline respectfulness
when a braking alarm is propagated to the follower.
Vehicular networking technologies and the study of their
underlying latency impact and security issues are mandatory
to perform tests under real circumstances of car circulation.
The main standards under consideration by the industry are
2https://github.com/mouelhis/adawrplatoon
the IEEE 802.11p for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environ-
ments (WAVE), based on Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network, and
the promised Long Term Evolution (LTE)-based V2X con-
ducted by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP),
based on cellular networks. The ITS-G5 European norm and
the Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC) equiva-
lent standardization in USA and Japan are pushing forward
IEEE 802.11p. They cover the specifications of the two low-
est (physical and data link) protocol stack layers of vehicular
networking systems at a frequency band ranging in [5.855,
5.925] GHz with V2V latency ranging between 10 ms for
fully autonomous vehicles and 100 ms for semi-autonomous
connected vehicles. Currently, these standards are mature,
stable and implemented by industries on thousands of cars.
LTE-Vehicle (LTE-V) has been deployed since a few years.
This picture got more complicated with the arrival of 5G
(fifth generation cellular network) technology shortly after
the launch of the LTE-V standardization process. 5G devices
embed a multitude of millimeter wave antennas allowing
very low latency (up to 1 ms) while increasing throughput.
Meanwhile, possible 5G solutions and the enhanced V2X
(eV2X) services are being analyzed and considered by 3GPP
in order to be up to date. A deep study of these issues at
the functional, design, and implementation levels using the
adapted hardware and software support would be a natural
extension of this work.
V. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTEGRATION
In this section, we analyze both the performance and the
properties of the platooning system. As briefly discussed
in Section IV, the sensors embedded in the leader of the
platoon always check whether there are obstacles in front of
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the vehicle. If any obstacle is detected, the alarm is imme-
diately activated. Once the alarm is activated, the leader of
the platoon starts braking and the authentication process with
the second vehicle of the platoon is triggered. This process
ensures the mutual authentication of the communicating par-
ties, and the certificates allow for strong security to protect
the transmission of the alarm signal sent by the platoon over
the V2V communication. Therefore, no external actor can
interfere with the vehicular network, for instance to make the
cars brake without the presence of an obstacle. If the authen-
tication process succeeds, the alarm is sent to the second
vehicle of the platoon. Once the second vehicle receives the
alarm signal, it immediately starts braking and launches an
authentication process with the third vehicle of the platoon.
If this process is successful, the alarm signal is transferred to
the third vehicle that forthwith starts braking until the whole
platoon is stopped.
The example given above presents the theoretically
required control flow, from detecting the obstacle until the
car platoon is fully stopped. Trust concerns are kept out of
the way by strong token-based security, but in practice things
can get more complicated and a closer look reveals several
potential problems.
The first problem is the potential successive failures of the
authentication process between two vehicles. In this case,
the alarm signal is not transmitted (or transmitted with a
delay). Subsequently, the succeeding vehicle will not brake
in time and will crash into the vehicle in front of it. In order to
address this issue, we combine safety and security techniques,
methods, and tools. The Arrowhead Framework secures the
V2V channel in advance by providing security tokens to
each vehicle. The impact of communication problems is
therefore minimized by reducing the number of messages
to be exchanged to support urgent events. As a result, this
technique also reduces the probability of message retransmis-
sions, which are the root causes of much longer communi-
cation delays. Moreover, to enhance safety, we equip each
vehicle of the platoon, and not only the leader, with its own
sensors. If the distance between the two vehicles decreases,
the vehicle brakes, independently of the communication
activities.
The second problem is related to timing constraints under
good communication conditions (nomessage retransmissions
on the underlying protocols). The experimental tests ana-
lyzed three different implementation for the communication
primitives: unsecure webservice, token-based webservice,
and SSL-based SSE. Figure 10 compares the communication
latency of the three approaches. The approach based on a
Web Service with persistent HTTPS (SSE) is much faster, and
it still makes use of the strong authentication/authorization
capabilities of the Arrowhead Framework to manage the
security of the SSL channel. A summary of the results is
reported in Table 2, which highlights that the (non-optimized)
webservice implementations do not satisfy the contracts,
while the SSE implementation is a viable method to establish
trust in a car fleet.
FIGURE 10. Comparison of implementations of primitives.
TABLE 2. Measures for a V2V secure communication.
Higher performance can be granted to the SSE technique
by exchanging periodic keepalivemessages through the chan-
nel. Figure 11 analyzes a run with 10 messages sent through
the SSE approach, and shows that the first message takes
much longer than the following ones, since it has to wake
up a dormant connection. Thus we propose to exchange
periodic keepalive messages through the persistent Web Ser-
vice, to speed up the communication of urgent alarms such
as in the case at hand. Figure 12 presents the Cumulative
Distribution Function for the message delays in the case of
the SSE approach with keepalive messages, over a total of
100 messages.
FIGURE 11. Delays for 10 messages.
The results show that the time needed for the signal to
be transmitted from one vehicle to another is lower than
40 ms, if the best approach is used. This value represents the
measure of Z in assertion r12. With this, we can validate our
contracts. In particular, the correctness of Contract Secure
Authentication is validated with respect to the requirement
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FIGURE 12. Cumulative Distribution Function for the SSE approach with
keepalive.
of 120 ms latency. Clearly, if we select another approach,
for example Unsecured HTTP, the contract is not satisfied,
and correctness cannot be guaranteed according to our CAT
analysis. Therefore, either designers change the specification
on the model or another approach ought to be considered.
Indeed, this latency value constitutes a constraint as the
vehicles can be going at high speed (in a real scenario) and
the timing needs to be optimized in order to ensure that the
succeeding vehicle starts braking as soon as possible. To
solve this issue and to guarantee that the succeeding vehicle
starts braking before it is too late, we propose to not wait
until the authentication process is successful to transfer the
alarm signal. Therefore, once the alarm signal is received,
the vehicle instantly starts braking, sends the signal to the suc-
ceeding vehicle, starts the authentication process with both
vehicles and checks its own sensors. Consequently, the timing
between the transmission of the alarm signal and the effective
braking of the successive vehicle is optimized. This scenario
is specified by Contract Safe & Secure Brake Command.
Following our tests, the timing needed for a safe alarm com-
mand transfer is 80 ms (see Section IV-E), while the time
needed for a secure communication is lower than 40 ms if we
adopt SSE with keepalive. The contract is therefore verified:
the implementation is consistent with respect to the initial
specification. Similarly toContract Secure Authentication,
also in this case the choice of the approach plays a decisive
role in the validation of the contract.
VI. OUTLOOK AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are multiple benefits from automated driving technol-
ogy. Important examples of such advantages include opti-
mized power consumption, reduced emissions, improved
safety by decreased number of accidents caused by human
errors, increased passenger comfort by allowing for other
activities while driving, support of elderly or impaired users.
Furthermore, a lively competition on the international level
indicates that autonomous vehicles are widely accepted as
means to increase the economic performance of involved
countries. According to the Automotive World website,
75% of cars on the road will be autonomous by 2035.3
For instance, the automotive industry is the largest private
investor of R&D in Europe and by 2030 the expected eco-
nomic impact of automated driving will be up to e 71bn and
the global market for automated vehicles will be 44 million
vehicles respectively [51].
To realize these goals, international cooperation in R&D
is essential and can be strengthened by means of an agreed
approach and projects of common interest. Worldwide, var-
ious initiatives have been started to support competitiveness
and growth in the automotive sector. For example, trilateral
EU-US-Japan agreements simplify collaboration and sharing
of information on vehicle and road automation.4 National
programs, such as the USA’s ‘‘Intelligent Transportation
Systems Strategic Plan’’, Japan’s ‘‘Automated Driving for
Universal Services’’, China’s ‘‘Strategic Alliance for Intel-
ligent and Connected Vehicles’’ or ‘‘Smart Car Council’’ of
South Korea, invest significant funds into research, develop-
ment, standardization, and promotion of autonomous driving
technologies. In Europe, competitiveness and growth in the
automotive sector is supported by various initiatives such
as the European Road Transport Research Advisory Council
(ERTRAC)5 and GEAR 2030,6 which put together automo-
tive stakeholders and policymakers to ensure a coordinated
approach in Europe. Moreover, the European guidelines such
as ERTRAC Automated Driving Roadmap [51] are used by
industry and academia in order to create national roadmaps
reflecting local objectives and regulations, and generally to
facilitate public acceptance within a country.
In this paper we pursue these objectives by addressing the
potential conflicts between safety and security properties. We
considered safety and security properties during the design
phases of a platooning autonomous system: from textual
specification, modeling, 3D simulation, embedded software
to early prototyping. At the methodological level, we adopted
the Arrowhead Framework and a contract-based approach,
supported by CAT for simulation-based contract verification.
Although the involved supporting tools are not yet fully
optimized, our study clearly shows that the issue can effec-
tively be specified and analyzed at the design level. However,
at the prototyping level, we are faced with the problem of
ensuring safety with low latency. This technical constraint
could be mitigated with the use of very high-performance
processors and 5G. Nonetheless, promoting these issues at
the design level allows engineers to find alternative solutions
to guarantee the required safety level.
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